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FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING AND FARETTA:
REAFFIRMING COUNSEL'S VITAL ROLE WHEN
DEFENDANTS MANIPULATE COMPETING SIXTH
AMENDMENT REPRESENTATION RIGHTS
Marc C. McAllister*

I. INTRODUCTION
Just a few weeks before his trial on charges of mail fraud and
conspiracy, criminal defendant John Paul Hansen filed a motion with the
federal district court presiding over his case requesting "some form of
hybrid counsel."' Hansen requested to represent himself, at least in part,
so he could challenge the court's authority over him in ways his
appointed counsel would not.2 Hansen's true intent was not to waive his
right to the assistance of counsel.3 Indeed, Hansen never elected to
represent himself even after being advised of his right to do so, and in
pre-trial hearings, Hansen made clear that he did not desire to engage in
certain aspects of the litigation, including cross-examining witnesses or
filing certain motions. 4 Rather, Hansen's primary objective was simply
to make arguments regarding the court's authority that his attorney
rightly refused to make.5 In short, Hansen did not wish to fully represent
* Marc McAllister is an Assistant Professor of Law at Indiana Tech Law School. He has
completed three federal judicial clerkships and taught fourteen separate law school courses in nine
years of teaching. The author would like to thank the following faculty colleagues for their feedback
on this Article: Adam Lamparello, Nancy Marcus, andr6 douglas pond cummings, Yvonne
Lindgren, Cynthia Swann, John Nussbaumer, and Phebe Poydras.
1. The Grand Jury Charges, United States v. Hovind, No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR (N.D. Fla. May
18, 2015), ECF No. 3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65228. Hansen was indicted in a six-count
indictment. A jury trial in the case commenced on March 12, 2015. At the close of trial, the jury
found Hansen guilty of two counts of criminal contempt. Thereafter, Hansen was sentenced to
eighteen months in prison. Jury Verdict, Hovind, No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR, ECF No. 145. His appeal is
presently pending with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
2. Motion as Hybrid Counsel, Hovind,No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR, ECF No. 118.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. The jurisdictional challenges Hansen had in mind, had they been presented by his
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himself, nor did he wish to be fully represented by counsel. What he
desired was hybrid representation, which, unlike the right to counsel and
the right to self-representation, is not a constitutional right.6
Given Hansen's history of disregarding court orders, disrespecting
the judicial process, and advancing frivolous arguments, underlying his
conduct was the sense that he was playing games with the court and
deliberately obstructing the proceedings by refusing to choose either of
his two Sixth Amendment rights: representation or self-representation by
counsel.7 Wisely, the judge presiding over Hansen's case denied his
request for hybrid representation and forced him to clearly choose his
path.8 Hansen could not have it both ways. He had to decide. Eventually,
Hansen chose to defend the charges with counsel's assistance, and his
lawyer's excellent performance at trial likely spared him from being
convicted of the more serious charges against him.9
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants "the right to ... the Assistance of Counsel."1 In this text,
the Supreme Court has found two fundamental rights: the right to
representation by counsel 1' and the right to self-representation.12 Cases

attorney, would have been frivolous. See Francis X. Sullivan, Comment, The "Usurping Octopus of
JurisdictionalAuthority":The Legal Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 Wis. L.
REv. 785, 795-812 (1999) (analyzing Sovereign Citizen legal arguments regarding citizenship, legal
rights, jurisdiction of courts, and constitutional interpretation); see also Julia Melle, Comment,
Illogical Extremes: The Sovereign Citizens Movement and the FirstAmendment, 22 TEMP. POL. &
CIv. RTs. L. REv. 554, 554 (2013) ("[M]embers of the Sovereign Citizens Movement. .. [are]
political extremists who reject the authority of the federal government and embrace several
convoluted conspiracy theories about U.S. laws and institutions.").
6. See Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (11 th Cir. 1990) (explaining that "an
individual does not have a right to hybrid representation" and concluding that a defendant "had no
intention of waiving his right to counsel" when he "seemingly" requested to proceed pro se but later
explained he did not wish to "get[] up and mak[e] Motions and everything else," as his wish was
simply to address the jury during the opening statement and to address the court).
7. As alleged in the Superseding Indictment, Hansen had allegedly "willfully and knowingly
disobey[ed] and resist[ed] a lawful process, decree, and command of [the] court" by disregarding a
grand jury subpoena directing him to appear to provide handwriting samples and fingerprints. See
Indictment at 8, Hovind, No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR, ECF No. 3. This conduct led to a criminal contempt
charge against Hansen, for which he was ultimately convicted. Hovind, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65228 at *1 &n. 1.
8. Order, Hovind, No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR, ECF No. 60.
9. Hansen was convicted only of criminal contempt, and was not convicted of the more
serious mail fraud and conspiracy charges contained in the indictment. Hovind, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65228 at *1 & n. 1. The author observed Hansen's entire trial and believes his attorney's
excellent performance led to a hung jury on the more serious charges against Hansen. See Jury
Verdict, Hovind, No. 3:14-cr-91/MCR, ECF No. 145.
10.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

11. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
12. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814-32 (1975).
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like Hansen's pit these competing rights against each other,13 and can
place courts in difficult positions, with reversible error on the line, given
that the consequence for preventing a defendant from freely exercising
either competing right is automatic reversal of conviction.' 4
Although difficult for the court, Hansen's case was made easier by
the fact that he ultimately chose to defend the charges against him with
counsel's assistance. To the dismay of courts, defendants like Hansen
often refuse to elect either Sixth Amendment right all the way through
the start of trial, instead peppering the court with vague and ambiguous
statements regarding the two rights, often in an attempt to inject error
into the record.15 In such cases, defendants will state that they wish to
"involuntarily waive" their right to counsel while simultaneously
claiming that they do not wish to represent themselves.16 Others will
"fire" their appointed counsel but also refuse to represent themselves,
hoping to make it appear on appeal as if either eventual outcomerepresentation by counsel or self-representation-was compelled. 7
When a defendant flatly refuses to choose between the competing rights
-by,
for example, remaining silent when asked to decide--or
deliberately equivocates when pressed to do so-by, for example,
making nonsensical or conflicting statements-choices must be made for
the defendant if trial is to be conducted within the confines of the
Speedy Trial Act.'8
13. See United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 649 (4th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he right to selfrepresentation is inescapably in tension with the right to counsel ... because invocation of the
former... 'requires that the defendant waive his right to counsel."' (quoting Fields v. Murray, 49
F.3d 1024, 1028 (4th Cir. 1995))); see also United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005)
("Th[e right to self-representation] ... is mutually exclusive of the right to counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment.").
14. See United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 2010) ("An impermissible denial
of self-representation cannot be harmless."); United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.
1997) ("[T]he right to counsel is so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as
harmless error.") (alteration in original); see also Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th
Cir. 1990) ("A trial court's evaluation of an individual's desire to represent himself is fraught with
the possibility of error. Because self-representation necessarily entails the waiver of the sixth
amendment right to counsel, a trial court can commit reversible constitutional error by either
improperly granting a request to proceed pro se-and thereby depriving the individual of his right to
counsel-or by denying a proper assertion of the right to represent oneself, and thereby violating
Faretta.");Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining that harmless
error analysis does not apply when the right to represent oneself is violated because "[a] defendant
has a moral right," grounded in notions of free will, "to stand alone in his hour of trial and to
embrace the consequences of that course of action").
15. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2008).
17. See, e.g., Long, 597 F.3d at 725-26.
18. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2012). When a defendant remains
uncooperative as trial approaches, the court might reasonably assume the defendant's intent is to
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This Article considers the proper solution for cases where an
indigent defendant deliberately fails to choose either self-representation
or representation by counsel and chooses, instead, to confound the court
with equivocal requests and ambiguous responses. 19 There is presently
no U.S. Supreme Court precedent that deals with this issue.20 Thus,
when courts are confronted with a defendant who deliberately
equivocates between self-representation and counsel's assistance, some
impose self-representation,21 while others require the accused to defend
with counsel's assistance. 22 This lack of uniformity among, and even
delay trial long enough to assert a Speedy Trial Act claim. See, e.g., United States v. Kelm, 827
F.2d 1319, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming defendant's conviction in a retained counsel case in
which defendant manipulated his right to counsel to effect delay by obtaining three continuances for
the stated purpose of securing retained counsel, eventually leading to defendant's motion to dismiss
on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the constraints of the Speedy Trial Act; in
upholding Kelm's conviction, the Ninth Circuit declared, "a court must be wary against the 'right of
counsel' being used as a ploy to gain time or effect delay" and that "[t]he trial court's determination
that Kelm's actions constituted a waiver of his right to counsel represented a valid response to
Kelm's dilatory tactics").
19. This Article does not consider non-indigent defendants who do not qualify for courtappointed counsel and effect delay by refusing to retain counsel while rejecting self-representation.
According to many courts, a defendant's ability to pay for counsel, plus steadfast refusal to do so,
inevitably leads to waiver of counsel and, consequently, self-representation. See, e.g., United States
v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992); Siniard v. State, 491 So. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986); State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 506 (Minn. 2009).
20. The best guidance the Supreme Court has provided is a footnote in Faretta,which notes
that a defendant can waive his right to pro se representation by his obstructionist conduct. See
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975) ("We are told that many criminal defendants
representing themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their trials. But... the
trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and
obstructionist misconduct.... The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of
the courtroom."). The Faretta footnote addresses the scenario where a defendant has already clearly
and unequivocally elected to proceed pro se and, thereafter, engages in obstructionist conduct or
otherwise inhibits trial. Thus, the footnote does not address the threshold question of what choice
should be made for the defendant who wholly refuses to elect either Sixth Amendment right.
21. See, e.g., Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265-70 (affirming trial court's finding that defendant
waived his right to counsel by his misconduct); Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir.
2004) (suggesting dilatory behavior or other misconduct justifies waiver of the right to counsel); see
also King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008,
1010 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2001); McKee v.
Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1981).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2015) (reversing
defendant's conviction and adopting a strong preference for counsel's assistance for defendants who
steadfastly refuse to exercise either Sixth Amendment right); Long, 597 F.3d at 728-29 (affirming
defendant's conviction where trial court required defendant to defend with counsel's assistance after
he fired his appointed attorney but failed to adequately elect self-representation); United States v.
Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079-81 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming conviction and upholding trial court's
finding that defendant forfeited his right to represent himself due to his obstructionist conduct and
failure to answer questions regarding whether he truly wished to represent himself); United States v.
Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing defendant's conviction because trial court
erred in finding defendant waived his right to counsel by his misconduct); cf United States v.
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within, appellate courts places trial courts in precarious positions, leads
to inconsistent outcomes in similar cases, and often heightens the danger
of wrongful conviction due to inadequate trial preparation.23
To foster uniformity in this situation and strip obstructionist
defendants of a tool for manipulating courts, this Article argues that trial
courts should routinely elect representation by counsel for the unruly
defendant who fails to make the requisite election,2 4 subject only to a
narrow exception for instances of severe physical or verbal abuse of
appointed counsel. 25 The solution proposed in this Article is simple.
Rather than being forced to participate in the defendant's game all the
way through the start of trial, where only then can a court be assured that
any request for self-representation may properly be denied as untimely, a
court faced with an unruly defendant should instead be permitted to
make a factual finding that the defendant is intentionally refusing to
make a clear choice between the right to counsel and the right to selfrepresentation.2 6 Such a finding could be made at any point before trial,
and, once made, would give the court sole discretion to make the Sixth
Amendment election for the defendant, which should ordinarily be
representation by counsel. To simplify the framework for appellate
courts and curtail the need for burdensome second trials, this Article
further proposes that the trial court's decision on the representation issue
should stand, absent a clear abuse of discretion proven only by a lack of
actual obstructionist conduct by the defendant.2 7
This proposal is supported by the Sixth Amendment's text, which
directly contemplates "the Assistance of Counsel '28 in one's defense
and more subtly implies the right to represent oneself;2 9 the elaborate
Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 2007) ("A trial judge may terminate self-representation when the
defendant engages in serious obstructionist misconduct.").
23. Compare Brock, 159 F.3d at 1079-81 (upholding trial court's decision to revoke
defendant's pro se status and defend with counsel's assistance due to defendant's obstructionist
behavior), with Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670-71 (finding defendant to have waived his right to counsel,
requiring him to defend pro se, despite having never requested to represent himself).
24. See infra Part V.A.
25. See infra Part V.D.
26.
27.

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.A-B.

28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). In deeming the right to pro se
representation a fundamental right, the Supreme Court in Faretta acknowledged that the right to
self-representation is implied by the Sixth Amendment. See id. (holding that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment, when naturally read, ...implies a right of self-representation"). For a somewhat
different interpretation of the Sixth Amendment text, see id. at 820 (noting that the counsel
provision "speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an
assistant"). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
114-15 (1998).
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procedure that typically must be followed before a defendant may waive
his right to representation, making it the default right;3" and counsel's
vital role in ensuring fair trials and preventing wrongful convictions. If a
choice must be made for the obstructionist defendant, the choice should
be a defense with counsel's assistance.
Finally, this Article argues that the strained waiver analysis
courts have employed in these cases should be replaced with the
doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, which recognizes that a criminal
defendant must not be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing.3
Borrowed from the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation,
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing better characterizes the situation at hand,
where it is more accurate to find that a defendant forfeits, rather than
waives, his right to self-representation by intentionally engaging in
obstructionist misconduct.32
Part II of this Article examines Supreme Court precedent regarding
the competing rights to counsel and self-representation.33 Part III
examines federal appellate court decisions involving defendants who
manipulate the rights to counsel and self-representation to delay trial or
inject error into the record, and unveils a split among courts regarding
which right should prevail when a defendant steadfastly refuses to
choose between the two. 4 Part IV examines case law governing when a
request to proceed pro se may be denied as untimely, which, as it stands,
permits obstructionist defendants to manipulate the judicial process all
the way through the start of trial.3 5 Part V sets forth a uniform proposal
for the obstructionist defendant that, if adopted, would destroy the
defendant's ability to manipulate the court while simultaneously helping
prevent wrongful convictions.36

30. See United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he right to counsel is in
force until waived, [and] the' right to self-representation does not attach until asserted." (quoting
Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1983))).
31. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358-68 (2008) (ratifying the common law doctrine
that a defendant may forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through his
own wrongdoing and holding that the Confrontation Clause's forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception
requires both an act of wrongdoing directed at a would-be witness coupled with the specific intent
of preventing the potential witness from testifying).
32. See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-1101 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing the
differences between waiver and forfeiture, and noting that, "[u]nlike waiver, which requires a
knowing and intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture results in the loss of a right
regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended
to relinquish the right").
33. See infra Part IL
34. See infra Part ll.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part V.
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II.

THE COMPETING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants "the right
to... the Assistance of Counsel."3 7 In the 1963 decision of Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Supreme Court deemed the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel a fundamental right, and it mandated governmentfunded counsel for all indigent defendants facing felony charges in
federal or state court.38 Stressing counsel's critical role in ensuring a fair
trial, Gideon effectuated the "obvious truth" that "any person haled into
court... cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him."3 9 Three decades before Gideon, the Supreme Court in Powell
v. Alabama had acknowledged that "[e]ven the intelligent and educated
layman... lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one,"4 and thus "requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings. '" "' Without
it, the Powell Court declared, "though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence. 42
In the decades following Gideon and Powell, the Supreme Court
has continued to recognize the vital role of counsel in criminal trials. In
1978, the Court declared "there is no right more essential than the right
to the assistance of counsel. '43 In 1984, the Court stated that the right to
counsel is "critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results."" In 2000, the Court noted that "no one ...attempts to argue
that as a rule pro se representation is wise, desirable, or efficient, ' and
in 2002, a majority of the Justices praised "the effect [the right to
counsel] has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial." '
Despite the Court's acknowledgment of counsel's essential role in
ensuring a fair trial, the Court in Farettav. Californiaheld that the right
of self-representation, and its corresponding right to reject counsel's
assistance, is also a fundamental right guaranteed by the same Sixth
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). While Gideon is somewhat unclear on the precise effect of
its ruling, the Supreme Court later clarified in Nichols v. United States that the right applies to all
felonies. See 511 U.S. 738, 743 (1994).
39. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
40. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).
44. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751 (1983) (recognizing the "superior ability of trained counsel" to advocate for an accused).
45. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000).
46. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002).
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Amendment text.47 The Farettamajority conceded that the right of selfrepresentation is not explicitly mentioned in the Sixth Amendment but
deemed the right to represent oneself "implied by the structure of the
Amendment. '48 The majority grounded its ruling in notions of free will
and emphasized the defendant's right to choose between defending
himself and defending through counsel.49 The Court stated, for example,
"that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his
basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so."" The Court also
declared that early American colonial charters and declarations of rights
"establish that the 'right to counsel' meant to the colonists a right to
choose between pleading through a lawyer and representing oneself."5 1
According to Faretta, a defendant who wishes to waive counsel
should clearly and unequivocally request self-representation52 and must
do so in a timely manner, typically well before trial.53 Equivocal and
untimely requests must be denied.54 Once a defendant unequivocally
requests self-representation, the court must then conduct a detailed
inquiry to ensure the defendant's election is knowing and intelligent.5 5
The court's inquiry must ordinarily include instruction as to the nature

47. 422 U.S. 806, 820-21 (1975).
48. Id. at 819, 821 ("The Sixth Amendment, when naturally read.. . implies a right of selfrepresentation.").
49. Id. at 835-36.
50. Id. at 817.
51. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). Even before Faretta, federal courts found a Sixth
Amendment basis for the right to conduct one's own defense, and grounded that right in notions of
free will choice. See Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 889-91 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing
the right of a defendant to conduct their own defense); Middlebrooks v. United States, 457 F.2d
657, 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (explaining that the decision to represent oneself is an exercise of
defendant's "freedom of choice").
52. See Faretta,422 U.S. at 835-36.
53. See id. (holding the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to pro se representation was
violated when, weeks before trial, he "clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he
wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel").
54. Generally uncooperative and non-responsive comments in response to a judge's attempt to
establish a Faretta dialogue have been deemed insufficient to invoke the Faretta right. See, e.g.,
United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 724-26 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that, as a result of the
defendant's uncooperative conduct, he "did not clearly and unequivocally both waive his right to
counsel and assert his right to self-representation"). In addition, courts have held that the right of
self-representation is waived as the result of an untimely request. See, e.g., Wood v. Quarterman,
491 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[C]ourts have discretion about whether to grant a defendant's
motion to proceed pro se when the motion is untimely."); United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791,
808-09 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
request to represent herself made four or five days before the start of trial in part because the request
was untimely); United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The district court was
not obliged to honor Davis's mid-trial request to represent himself.").
55. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (explaining that "the accused must 'knowingly and
intelligently' forgo.., relinquished benefits" of appointed counsel).
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of the charges, possible penalties, and dangers of self-representation.5 6
Even at this stage, a defendant who desires to represent himself but
does not demonstrate adequate knowledge regarding the risks of
representation must proceed with counsel.57
By requiring courts to inform a defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation before a defendant may waive the
corresponding right to the assistance of counsel, Faretta effectively
implements a default of representation, arguably elevating assistance of
counsel as the preeminent Sixth Amendment right.58 The FarettaCourt
further acknowledged the right to counsel's preeminence over the right
of self-representation by conceding, for example, that "most
criminal... defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than
by their own unskilled efforts." 59
Having grounded its ruling in the need to uphold a defendant's free
will to choose, however harmful that choice may be, Faretta did not
determine the proper course for a defendant who fails or refuses to
choose. In addition, the Supreme Court has never ruled that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees hybrid representation.6" As a result, trial courts
56. See United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 2007) (deriving "a three-factor
test from Faretta, under which '[i]n order to deem a defendant's Faretta waiver knowing and
intelligent, the district court must insure that he understands 1) the nature of the charges against
him, 2) the possible penalties, and 3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation'); see
also United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 648-50 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jones, 452 F.3d
223, 228-29, 228 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring a "penetrating and comprehensive examination of all
the circumstances" but acknowledging that such an inquiry "is not required in every court").
57. See Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The purpose of this
hearing is to reduce the likelihood of constitutional error by eliciting from the defendant and
explicitly establishing for the record his awareness of his constitutional rights, his decision to waive
the right to counsel, his awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se, and his unambiguous decision
to proceed without counsel.").
58. See Long, 597 F.3d at 724 ("[T]he right to counsel is in force until waived, [and] the right
to self-representation does not attach until asserted." (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v.
Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1983))). But see United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1264
n.4 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Although it is true that the right to counsel attaches automatically, the
Supreme Court has never declared the right to counsel 'preeminent' over the right to selfrepresentation. To the contrary, Farettaclearly stated 'there is no evidence that the colonists and the
Framers ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that this right might be
considered inferior to the right of assistance of counsel.' We understand neither right to be inferior
to the other.").
59. Faretta,422 U.S. at 834.
60. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) ("Farettadoes not require a trial
judge to permit 'hybrid' representation of the type Wiggins was actually allowed."). Lower courts
agree that a defendant has no constitutional right to "hybrid" representation consisting of both pro se
representation and representation by counsel. See Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291-92
(11 th Cir. 1990) (explaining that "an individual does not have a right to hybrid representation" in
the Eleventh Circuit); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Nor did the
trial court err in refusing to permit [defendant] to participate as co-counsel in his case. [Defendant]
had an experienced counsel and, so long as he retained him, he could not appear pro se. If he wished
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generally have discretion to permit hybrid representation-consisting of
a co-counsel arrangement between the accused and his appointed
attorney-but are often reluctant to do so to avoid jury confusion and
potential conflict between the accused and his attorney.61 For these
reasons, when a court denies a defendant's request for hybrid
representation, and the defendant subsequently does not elect to
represent himself, the defendant may not control trial strategy or
otherwise assume the role of the attorney in the litigation.6 2 If the
defendant wishes to have greater control over the litigation, his only
constitutional option is self-representation.
III.

EQUIVOCATION, OBSTRUCTION, AND DILATORY CONDUCT

Farettapresupposes a cooperative defendant who desires to waive
counsel and unequivocally voices that decision in a timely manner,
typically before a jury is empaneled.63 To the dismay of courts, unruly
defendants sometimes voice dissatisfaction with appointed counsel
while refusing to elect self-representation, thereby injecting a danger

to handle the case pro se, [defendant] should have discharged his retained counsel."); Hall v.
Dorsey, 534 F. Supp. 507, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Under federal law, a criminal defendant has the
right to appear pro se or by counsel ....The federal right, however, is disjunctive; a party may
either represent himself or appear through an attorney. There is no right to 'hybrid' representationsimultaneously pro se and by counsel.").
61. See Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1292-96 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district
court's decision to permit hybrid representation, and rejecting defendant's argument on appeal that
Faretta was violated by hybrid arrangement, where hybrid representation, rather than selfrepresentation, was the defendant's clear choice); United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498
(11 th Cir. 1987) (announcing that courts in the Eleventh Circuit have discretion to permit hybrid
representation and that "the right to counsel and the right to proceed pro se exist in the alternative
and the decision to permit a defendant to proceed in a hybrid fashion rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Arreola, No. 11-3348, 2012 WL 2855787, at *4 n.3 (10th
Cir. July 12, 2012) (denying counsel's motion to withdraw and defendant's pro se request to file a
supplemental brief on the grounds that there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation, after
initial appellate briefs were filed); United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012)
(refusing to consider defendant's pro se briefs under the Third Circuit's "longstanding prohibition
on hybrid representation"); Hill v. Carlton, No. 08-5373, 2010 WL 3272800, at *5 & n.2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 19, 2010) (citing a long line of Tennessee cases finding that a defendant may not file a pro se
brief when he is represented by counsel); United States v. Whitman, No. 99-21067, 2001 WL
360789, at *1-4 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2001) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's pro se
motion for "hybrid representation," in which defendant requested permission to file pro se motions
so that he could "decide issues of his own defense"); United States v. Reed, No. 13-CR-6172L,
2014 WL 4425795, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014) ("[T]he ample authority [that exists] that a
defendant has no absolute right to hybrid representation, that is, where both the defendant, pro se,
and his attorney file motions or other matters for court consideration.").
63. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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of automatic reversal in the event a higher court finds the trial court
incorrectly gauged the defendant's wishes. 6'
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether representation
by counsel or self-representation should prevail when a defendant
intentionally equivocates regarding the issue of representation.6 5 In
these situations, trial courts may exercise various options. The first
and most desirable option is to simply request the defendant to make a
clear and explicit choice, which, when accomplished, simultaneously
respects Faretta's autonomy concerns while avoiding a potential
Gideon reversal.6 6
A. Defendants Who Ultimately Make a Clear Choice
Most courts agree that a defendant's egregious attempt to delay trial
and inject reversible error into the record permits a court to force the
defendant to choose between self-representation and appointed
counsel.67 Once the court requires the defendant to make the requisite
election, the defendant may elect to proceed with counsel or pro se,
which averts the possibility of reversal; 68 or he may simply continue his

64. As noted, the remedy for either an erroneous removal of appointed counsel or erroneous
rejection of pro se representation is automatic reversal of conviction. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. One court has explained that "[w]ithout the clear and unequivocal assertion
requisite, 'trial courts would be in a position to be manipulated by defendants clever enough to
record an equivocal request to proceed without counsel in the expectation of a guaranteed error no
matter which way the trial court rules."' Russell v. State, 383 N.E.2d 309, 313-14 (Ind. 1978)
(quoting Anderson v. State, 370 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Ind. 1977)).
65. See United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The Supreme Court
has never confronted a case in which an uncooperative defendant has refused to accept appointed
counsel or engage in a [Faretta] colloquy with the court. Consequently, the Court has never been
asked to determine whether a defendant may waive counsel without making an explicit, unqualified
request to represent himself.").
66. See infra Part I.A.
67. See, e.g., Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265-66 ("When a defendant rejects his court-appointed
counsel or otherwise engages in behavior that creates tension between his right to counsel and his
right to self-representation, a district court does not compromise the defendant's free choice by
presenting him with accurate information regarding his lawful choices and asking him to choose
between them."); see also McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981) ("A criminal
defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another
course of action as long as the choice presented to him is not constitutionally offensive." (quoting
Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976))).
68. This assumes, of course, that any waiver of the right to counsel is sufficiently knowing
and intelligent. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1291 & n. 11 (11th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that a defendant's clear and unequivocal request to represent himself, such as through
the statement, "I want to be allowed to represent myself through this whole trial," requires the court
to engage in a colloquy to advise the defendant of the risks of self-representation and to elicit an
express waiver of his right to counsel, without which the reviewing court "would be compelled to
find reversible error").
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uncooperative behavior, thereby raising the stakes for all involved,
7
including the defendant, 69 the prosecution, and the court. 1
If, when forced to a choice, a defendant clearly elects either
competing right, the defendant's choice removes any potential Farettaor
Gideon error and averts the danger of automatic reversal. As compared
to cases where defendants insist on delaying or disrupting the
proceedings all the way through the start of trial, cases where defendants
ultimately choose counsel or self-representation present little problems
for reviewing courts.
United States v. Hardy exemplifies a case where a defendant
initially engaged in obstructionist behavior but ultimately chose one
Sixth Amendment right over the other.71 In Hardy, defendant David
Hardy was charged with willfully failing to file federal income tax
returns.72 At Hardy's arraignment, Hardy informed the court that he
wanted to represent himself with the help of Eric R. Eleson, who was not
a licensed attorney.7 3 Cognizant of Faretta's requirements, the
magistrate judge asked Hardy whether he understood the charges against
him.74 Eleson, on Hardy's behalf, stated that he did not, explaining that
Hardy was unsure whether he was being prosecuted under the laws of
the United States or under the Uniform Commercial Code.75 At
additional pre-trial hearings held on April 9th and May 2nd, Hardy
repeated his request for Eleson's assistance and demanded dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds.76 Each time, the magistrate judge explained that
Eleson was not a licensed attorney and could not represent him. 77 At the
May 2nd hearing, the magistrate judge explained the dangers of
appearing without counsel and offered to appoint a lawyer to represent
Hardy.78 The magistrate judge again asked Hardy if he understood the
charges, and Hardy again stated that he did not.7 9 At this point, the

69. The stakes are raised for the defendant because without a clear plan for trial and
uncertainty regarding who will carry the burden of litigation for the defense-the defendant faces a
heightened risk of conviction.
70. The stakes are raised for the prosecution and the court because, given the ambiguity that
remains and the lack of a clear path from higher courts in regards to the proper solution courts
should adopt in these scenarios, the danger of automatic reversal-and hence, of having to conduct
a burdensome second trial-is increased.
71. 941 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 894.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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magistrate judge asked Hardy whether he wished to waive counsel, but
Hardy refused, again insisting that Eleson represent him.8 °
On May 29th and May 31st, Hardy twice failed to appear for
scheduled pretrial conferences, causing a delay in trial. Hardy was then
arrested pursuant to a bench warrant.8 1 On July 13th, Hardy appeared for
his final pretrial conference, where he demanded criminal sanctions
against the prosecutor and the court for allegedly acting outside the
scope of their jurisdiction.8 2 The government then filed a motion to
determine the status of Hardy's representation.8 3 Thereafter, on five
separate occasions over a two day span, the court asked whether Hardy
wanted a lawyer, but Hardy continued to insist that Eleson represent
him.84 Finally, on July 31st, when the court asked, "Do you want an
attorney, yes or no?," Hardy unequivocally replied, "No, I don't, your
honor."85 Trial proceeded later that day with Hardy representing himself,
and Hardy was convicted of all charges. 86
On appeal, Hardy claimed that his right to counsel had been
violated. Rejecting this claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that "[Hardy] equivocated in response to the questions about
his wish to waive counsel but finally answered unequivocally that he did
not want a lawyer."87 Thus, Hardy sufficiently expressed his desire to
waive counsel. Finding Hardy's implied pro se election sufficiently
knowing and intelligent, the court deemed it reasonable to conclude
"from the conduct and responses of the defendant that he was play acting
and in fact well understood what he was charged with."88 The court
found it significant that "Hardy was a well-educated man who was
able to invoke case law.., and who gave every sign of being entirely
aware of knowing exactly the charges against him."89 Thus, Faretta's
waiver requirements were fully respected, and no Sixth Amendment
error occurred.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Hardy is significant in three
respects. First, although the trial court gave Hardy several chances to
clearly elect self-representation or representation by counsel despite

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 894-95.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
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his dilatory conduct--opportunities Hardy exploited through further
obstructionist behavior-the court eventually forced Hardy to a final
decision on the matter. At that point, Hardy clearly stated he did not
wish to be represented by an attorney, which was deemed sufficient to
waive Hardy's right to counsel.9" In the absence of a Farettaor Gideon
error, the danger of automatic reversal was averted. Second, although
not necessary to resolve the case, Hardy recognized that sufficiently
egregious misconduct may permit a court to find an implicit waiver of
the right to counsel, despite no explicit statement affirmatively electing
self-representation.91 Hardy stated that he did not want a lawyer; he
never affirmatively declared that he wished to represent himself. Yet,
both the trial and appellate court deemed his obstructionist conduct,
coupled with his ultimate rejection of appointed counsel, a sufficient
election of pro se representation.92 Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that courts are well-equipped to make a factual finding that a defendant
is refusing to clearly choose either the right to counsel or selfrepresentation, which, once made, allows a court to resolve the issue for
the defendant.93 The ability of a court to make such a factual finding is a
critical aspect of this Article's proposal and, as outlined below, is
necessary to resolve cases like Hardy's in a more uniform manner.94
B. Defendants Who Steadfastly Obstruct: Different Approaches by
Different Courts
If a defendant fails to elect either competing right even after the
court instructs the defendant to make a final election on the
representation issue, the trial court must make the decision for the
defendant if trial is to proceed in a timely manner. When this occurs and
the trial court's decision is appealed post-conviction, appellate courts
have employed differing approaches to the issue.
First, seemingly indifferent to the Sixth Amendment outcome,
some appellate courts hold that a trial court's decision on the
representation issue should stand, regardless of which form of

90. Id. at 896-97.
91. According to the court, "Hardy engaged in game playing, typical of a tax evader, in his
responses to the court as to whether he waived his right to counsel .... [I]n appropriate
circumstances a court can hold that such conduct amounts to waiver. These circumstances are
present here." Id. at 896.
92. Id. at 896-97.
93. See id.
94. See infra Part V.A.
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representation the court elects, absent a clear abuse of discretion. 95 These
decisions are premised not on upholding the defendant's free will
decision, but on simple deference to the trial court's need to control its
proceedings and manage its docket. 96
A second set of courts disfavor a finding of implied waiver of
counsel and reveal a preference for representation by counsel for the
obstructionist defendant. 97 Some appellate decisions in this category,
however, reflect an overarching desire to affirm a defendant's conviction
without taking a strong stance on the Sixth Amendment issue, making
them reminiscent of the deferential approach.
Third, similar to Hardy, some appellate courts find that a
defendant's implied rejection of appointed counsel equates to an
affirmative election of self-representation."s According to this view, if a
defendant rejects the only counsel to which he is constitutionally
entitled, even impliedly so, he has necessarily chosen self-representation
despite no affirmative election of that right.9 9 Because defendants in
such cases have not affirmatively elected either right, these decisions
actually reflect a preference for self-representation for defendants who
fail to make the requisite election.
Finally, similar to this Article's proposal, some courts adopt a
strong preference for counsel's assistance. According to these decisions,
implied waiver of counsel should be invoked only as a last resort option
and only in the most egregious cases, such as a defendant's extreme
abusive conduct toward appointed counsel.1"' Each of these categories is
examined below. 101

95.

See, e.g., United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265-68 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the

representation issue and emphasizing the need for trial courts to exercise discretion).
96. See Sarah Gerwig-Moore, Gideon's Vuvuzela: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment's
Promises with the Doctrines of Forfeiture and Implicit Waiver of Counsel, 81 MISS. L.J. 439, 47382 (2012).
97. See infra Part ll1.B.2.
98. See infra Part llI.B.3.

99. See, e.g., United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2001); see also King v.
Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[Defendant] King did not straightforwardly assert his
right to self-representation, and even told the trial court twice that he did not wish to represent
himself. Nonetheless, by rejecting all of his options except self-representation, King necessarily
chose self-representation.").
100. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing conviction
because trial court erroneously found defendant waived his right to counsel by misconduct, and
noting that courts should "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights, and doubts must be resolved in favor of no waiver").
101.

See infra PartlI.B.1-4.
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1. Deferential Approach
An en banc opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Garey, exemplifies the highly
deferential middle path, where the trial court's decision to impose self1 2
representation was upheld on appeal.
In Garey, defendant Eddie Milton Garey was indicted on twentyseven felony counts for his unsuccessful attempts to extort money by
threatening to bomb various buildings near Macon, Georgia. 103 Garey
had been represented by appointed counsel Scott Huggins for fifteen
months when, just three days before trial, Garey moved to substitute
counsel." ° According to Garey, Huggins' law office was located in
one of the buildings Garey had allegedly threatened to bomb, creating
a conflict of interest between the two. 105 Finding no actual conflict,
the trial court denied Garey's motion. 10 6 When Garey expressed
dissatisfaction with the court's ruling, the court gave Garey the option of
proceeding with Huggins or going pro se. 0 7 In response, Garey elected
to "involuntarily" waive counsel, 08 stating "if this Court is giving me no
other choice, I will have to go along with the choice of involuntarily
waiving my right to counsel, involuntarily waive."109 The court then
ordered Garey to represent himself and appointed Huggins as standby
counsel. 110 Garey later represented himself and was convicted of the
charges, receiving a sentence of thirty years. 1 '
A three judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
initially reversed Garey's conviction, but the en banc court vacated the
panel's opinion and found that Garey had waived his right to counsel by
his misconduct. 1 2 In reaffirming Garey's conviction, the en banc court
declared that "a valid waiver of counsel [may] occur not only when a
cooperative defendant affirmatively invokes his right to selfrepresentation, but also when an uncooperative defendant rejects the
only counsel to which he is constitutionally entitled, understanding his
only alternative is self-representation with its many attendant

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

540 F.3d 1253, 1258 (1 lth Cir. 2008).
For a detailed description of the facts, see id
Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.
Id.
Id.
For a summary of the actual exchange between Garey and the court, see id. at 1259-62.
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1262, 1270.
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' Applying this principle, the en banc court determined
dangers."113
that
14
Garey waived his right to counsel by his misconduct.'
Emphasizing the need for flexibility in this area, the Garey Court
declared that appellate courts are to respect and affirm a trial court's
handling of an unruly defendant, regardless of the trial court's decision,
stating as follows:

[W]e do not suggest that district courts are bound to interpret the
uncooperative behavior of every defendant as a waiver of the right to
counsel. Nor do we suggest a district court would err by requiring any
particular defendant to make a clear statement of his intention to
proceed pro se before agreeing to dismiss appointed counsel. In any
given case, the proper course of action
will turn on factors the district
5
court is best positioned to assess."
In a similar passage, the Garey court noted that "a court is not required
to relieve a criminal defendant of counsel when the defendant engages in
obstructionist conduct," and that "[o]ur decision today is meant to
provide trial courts with guidance and discretion-not to force courts to
'
discharge counsel against their better judgment. 116
2. Implied Waiver of Counsel Disfavored
Emphasizing the need for deference, Garey indicates that when a
defendant engages in obstructionist conduct, a trial court may decide to
relieve counsel and require the defendant to proceed pro se.117 However,
Garey also notes that courts might constitutionally take the opposite
approach, instead insisting that a defendant clearly and unequivocally
request pro se representation before losing the right to defend with
counsel's assistance.' 18 Absent abuse of discretion, appellate courts
should uphold the trial court's decision, regardless of which competing
right the court elects.

113. Id.at 1265. The court in Garey overruled a prior Eleventh Circuit decision, Marshall v.
Dugger, which had held that the right to counsel must be waived by a defendant's explicit request to
represent himself. 925 F.2d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 1991). According to Garey, "[i]nsofar as Marshall
failed to recognize waiver may occur outside the context discussed in Faretta,we conclude it was
wrongly decided." Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265.
114. Garey, 540 F.3d at 1266 ("[W]hen an indigent defendant rejects competent, conflict-free
counsel, he may waive his right to counsel by his uncooperative conduct, so long as his decision is
made with knowledge of his options and the consequences of his choice.").
115. Id. at 1266-67 ("[W]hen confronted with a defendant.., who refuses to provide clear
answers to questions regarding his Sixth Amendment rights,... the court may, in the exercise of its
discretion, discharge counsel." (emphasis added)).
116. Id.at 1267-68n.9.
117. Id. at 1267-68.
118. Seeid at 1264-65.
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Not all courts agree with Garey's deferential approach. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, instructs trial courts to resort to
implied waiver of counsel only upon a defendant's clear and explicit
election of self-representation.11 9 This approach, which reflects a
preference for counsel's assistance in situations where the defendant
does not affirmatively request to represent himself, is exemplified by
0
United States v. Meeks.12
In Meeks, defendant John Meeks was charged with a firearm
offense. 121 Because Meeks could not afford counsel, the district court
appointed Donald Hackney to represent him. Unhappy with Hackney,
Meeks retained Bevan Maxey. 2 2 A short time later, Meeks fired
Maxey. 123 Less than a week later, Meeks requested appointment of
counsel from a list of four attorneys. 124 After one listed attorney refused
appointment, the court appointed Russell Van Camp, another attorney on
the list. 121 One month later, Van Camp filed a motion to withdraw. 126 in
the interim, Meeks asked the court to appoint another attorney, Michael
Hemovich, also on Meeks' list. 2 7 Rather than appoint Hemovich, the
28
court ordered Meeks to either retain counsel or appear for trial pro se.
When trial commenced, attorney Thomas Cooney appeared with
Meeks. 12 9 Cooney asked for, but was denied, a thirty-day continuance. 3 °
Unable to obtain Cooney's assistance on such short notice, Meeks
defended the charges pro se, and was convicted.' 3'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Meeks had
been denied his constitutional right to counsel. The court distinguished a
factually similar case involving retained counsel, United States v.
Kelm, 13 2 and reasoned that while the district court's frustration with
Meeks was "understand[able]," it was improper to find waiver of
counsel via defendant's misconduct.'33 Unlike the defendant in Kelm,
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See infra notes 120-38.
987 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

131.

Id.

132. See United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding trial court
properly treated defendant's failure to retain counsel as waiver of his right to counsel and invocation
of self-representation).
133. Meeks, 987 F.2d at 579.
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who was financially in control of whether or not he had counsel and
chose not to retain counsel, Meeks had been appointed counsel by the
court (Van Camp). Thus, the court, not Meeks, controlled whether
Meeks received continued representation. 3 4 According to the Ninth
Circuit, the trial court erred in denying Meeks' motion to substitute
counsel, while simultaneously granting Van Camp's motion to
withdraw, effectively "waiv[ing] Meeks' right to counsel for him,
'
leaving him without representation."135
Unlike Garey, which simply deferred to the trial court's decision to
impose self-representation on the defendant despite no affirmative
election of that right, the Meeks court set forth more specific guidelines
for dealing with the obstructionist defendant, effectively requiring a
defendant to affirmatively elect self-representation. According to Meeks,
the trial court should have either (1) left Van Camp as Meeks's
appointed counsel; (2) appointed Hemovich as substitute counsel; or (3)
"given Meeks the opportunity to knowingly and intelligently waive his
136
right to counsel and to proceed pro se," if that was his wish.
According to Meeks, the trial court erred in failing to employ any of
13 7
these options.
By outlining three options for the trial court to follow, two of which
would have left Meeks represented by counsel, and the third required
him to affirmatively elect self-representation, Meeks indicates that
obstructionist defendants should be represented by counsel in the
absence of a genuine request to proceed pro se. The case is thus
unlike Garey, which found that self-representation may be imposed
"when an uncooperative defendant rejects the only counsel to which he
is constitutionally entitled," despite no affirmative election to proceed
pro se. 138
Like the Ninth Circuit in Meeks, several other federal
circuit courts have determined that a defendant's obstructionist
or dilatory conduct should result in waiver of the right to selfrepresentation, rather than waiver of the right to counsel, including
the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal.' 39
However, some of these decisions reflect an overriding desire to
affirm a defendant's conviction, causing the court to affirm the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11 th Cir. 2008).
139. See United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 651 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Long,
597 F.3d 720, 727-28 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1998).
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trial court's ruling on the representation issue, regardless of the Sixth
Amendment outcome.
A recent Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Long, exemplifies
a decision favoring representation by counsel, but one where the
appellate court's desire to affirm the defendant's conviction may
have been the driving force on appeal. 140 In Long, defendant James
Michael Long repeatedly "fired" his appointed counsel while
consistently refusing to represent himself. 14 1 Long thwarted each of
the court's attempts to hold a Faretta hearing until the day 1of
42
trial, causing the court to make the representation decision for him.
After the court required Long to proceed to trial with counsel's
assistance, the jury found Long guilty on four counts of willfully failing
to file income tax returns.' 43 Long then appealed his conviction, arguing
that the district court wrongfully denied him the right to represent
himself and erred in denying his pro se motion to dismiss based on
the Speedy Trial Act.'" Rejecting Long's arguments, the court
emphasized that Long never clearly and unequivocally requested to
proceed pro se, as Farettarequires, adding that "something more than
just firing one's attorney is required before one clearly and
14
unequivocally requests to proceed pro se. '
Recognizing the right to
counsel as the default right, the court declared that "[t]he right to counsel
is in force until waived, [and] the right to self-representation does not
146
attach until asserted.',
Although the court found that "Long did not clearly and
unequivocally both waive his right to counsel and assert his right to selfrepresentation,' 1 47 which was sufficient to reject his Faretta argument,
the court went on to address whether Long had affirmatively waived his
right to self-representation by his misconduct. Finding that he did, the
court declared:
Even if Long had clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to selfrepresentation, that right may be waived by his actions ....
Long's
conduct in the instant case suggested disruptive and obstructionist
behavior ....
Each time a magistrate judge had attempted to conduct a
Faretta hearing, Long was extremely uncooperative. Long's actions
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
1983)).
147.

597 F.3d 720.
Id at 722-23.
See id. at 725-26.
Id.at 722.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir.
Id.at 726.
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led to the court pushing back the [proceedings] .... [Finally], Long
denied wanting to represent himself .... [T]hese facts tend to suggest

that Long's behavior of itself may
well have resulted in the waiver of
148
his right to self-representation.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Brock followed
an approach similar to Long, adopting what amounts to a preference for
counsel's assistance for a defendant who steadfastly refuses to exercise
either Sixth Amendment right but, again, was arguably driven by the
court's desire to avoid reversing defendant's conviction.149
Soon after being indicted on six felony charges, Michael Brock
quickly "filed a pro se motion announcing that neither his courtappointed attorney nor any other attorney was authorized to represent
him."15 Thereafter, the district judge conducted a hearing to determine
whether Brock wished to represent himself, during which Brock
repeatedly demanded a Bill of Particulars, challenged the court's
authority, and "refused to answer the [c]ourt's questions or to cooperate
in any way with the proceedings."' 5 1 After holding Brock in contempt,
the court relieved his court-appointed attorney, required Brock to
proceed pro se and appointed another attorney, William Marsh, as
standby counsel.152 The court later reconsidered its ruling, and after
additional hearings in which Brock refused to discuss whether he wanted
to proceed pro se, found that he "ha[d] forfeited his right to represent
himself."' 53 Brock was then tried by a jury with Marsh as his attorney
54
and was convicted of all charges against him. 1
On appeal, Brock argued that his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation had been violated.' 55 Focusing on whether the trial court
erred in finding that Brock had forfeited his right to represent himself by
his misconduct, the court declared that "when a defendant's obstreperous
behavior is so disruptive that the trial cannot move forward, it is within
148. Id. at 726-27.
149. 159 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 1078.
151. Id. (alteration in original).
152. Id. at 1079. Some courts view pro se representation with the assistance of standby counsel
as a suitable "middle path." Gerwig-Moore, supra note 96, at 447. Nevertheless, trial with the
assistance of standby counsel generally does not satisfy a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Standby assistance of
counsel, however, does not satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 'The assistance of
standby counsel, no matter how useful to the court or the defendant, cannot qualify as the assistance
of counsel, required by the Sixth Amendment."' (quoting United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312
(5th Cir. 1991))).
153. Brock, 159 F.3d at 1079 (alteration in original).
154. See id.
155. Id.
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the trial judge's discretion to require the defendant to be represented by
counsel."' 56 The court analogized the case to UnitedStates v. Brown,157 a
case in which the Seventh Circuit likewise found a defendant to have
"forfeited his right to represent himself' by his obstructionist conduct.158
The court emphasized that, like the defendant in Brown, Brock made
requests that were denied by the district judge, expressed dissatisfaction
with the judge's rulings by refusing to proceed, and steadfastly refused
to cooperate even after being cited for contempt.' 59 The court further
emphasized that "Brock stubbornly ... insist[ed] that the court... state
the basis for its authority," a scenario common in these cases, and
consistently "refus[ed] to answer the court's [specific] questions"
regarding whether he truly desired to represent himself. 6 ° Thus, the
court found that the trial judge was "within her discretion in revoking
Brock's pro se status."161
Although the Eleventh Circuit in Garey upheld a finding of waiver
of counsel by misconduct, thereby ratifying judicially-imposed selfrepresentation, the Fifth Circuit in Long and the Seventh Circuit in Brock
invoked nearly identical misconduct to support the opposite outcome,
leading to loss of the right to self-representation. Despite having reached
different results on the representation issue, all three decisions reflect a
preference for deferring to trial courts in this difficult area, and each may
be explained by the overriding desire to avoid reversing a conviction and
remanding for a new trial.' 62
3. Implied Election of Self-Representation
Unlike Long and Brock, which reflect only a subtle preference for
counsel's assistance, some courts have taken more extreme positions in
such cases, even where the result is reversal of conviction. At one
extreme is a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, United
States v. Oreye, which upheld the trial court's finding of an implied
waiver of the right to counsel's assistance despite very little misconduct
on the defendant's part and without the defendant having expressed any
preference on the issue (i.e., without the defendant having "rejected"
appointed counsel).163
156. Id.
157. 791 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1986).
158. Brock, 159 F.3d at 1080; Brown, 791 F.2d at 579.
159. Brock, 159 F.3d at 1080.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. But see United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 578-79 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing
defendant's conviction due to a Sixth Amendment error).
163. 263 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2001).
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1249

In Oreye, defendant James Oreye was indicted and appointed
counsel named Steven Saltzman." After Oreye filed a motion to
dismiss the indictment on the basis of mistaken identity, Oreye became
dissatisfied with Saltzman, likely because he did not agree with Oreye's
mistaken identity defense, prompting the judge to appoint a substitute
65
counsel named Steven Shanin.1
Six business days before trial was to begin, Shanin filed a motion to
withdraw as Oreye's attorney, stating that they had an irreconcilable
difference of opinion over how to conduct the defense. 166 The trial court
held a hearing on the motion, which concluded with the judge giving
Oreye the following options: (1) stay with Shanin; (2) find another
lawyer who would be ready to go to trial on schedule (with no extension
of the trial date); or (3) represent himself.167 Oreye, however, failed to
select any of the three options, and indeed "never said he wanted to
proceed pro se. 168 Nevertheless, the trial court determined that Oreye
had waived his right to counsel and required him to personally defend
the charges with Shanin serving as standby counsel.1 69 Oreye was then
convicted of most charges against him.170
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found no error
in the trial court's handling of the Sixth Amendment issue, reasoning
as follows:
If you're given several options, and turn down all but one, you've
selected the one you didn't turn down. Granted, some cases from other
circuits require evidence of misconduct to establish waiver [of the right
to counsel] by conduct. But ...we think these cases are wrong. The
question of waiver is one of inference from the facts. As a matter both
of logic and of common sense .... if a person is offered a choice
between three things and says "no" to the first and the second, he's

164. Id.at 670; see United States v. Oreye, No. 98-CR-434, 1999 WL 558127, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
July 26, 1999).
165. See Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670; Oreye, 1999 WL 558127, at *1. The trial court explained that
Oreye and Saltzman "had problems almost from the very outset," and that in cases involving
"irreconcilable differences," its approach is to "treat[] a falling out between lawyer and client as
pretty much equivalent to no-fault divorce, so that withdrawal is granted irrespective of who
requests it." Oreye, 1999 WL 558127, at *1.
166. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Oreye, 1999 WL 558127, at *1 (explaining that the trial court elected to treat Oreye's
"overall conduct as amounting to a waiver-perhaps more accurately a forfeiture-of his right to
counsel," and "the relevant case law on the subject" led the court to grant the motion for Shanin's
withdrawal while denying the motion for appointment of new counsel).
170. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 671; Oreye, 1999 WL 558127 at *2.
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chosen the third even
if he stands mute when asked whether the third is
1 71
indeed his choice.

Although Oreye's reasoning has a certain allure, the decision
disregards the Sixth Amendment's inherent representation default,
brushes aside Faretta's elaborate waiver procedure, and ratifies this
approach even in the absence of genuine misconduct on the defendant's
part. 7 2 Regarding the Faretta waiver process, the Oreye Court
acknowledged that "the warnings given by the district judge ... were

rather perfunctory," and that the judge "mentioned 'difficulties' of selfrepresentation but did not dilate on them," further noting that Oreye is a
foreigner whose English was poor.'7 3 Given Faretta'sclear emphasis on
respecting a defendant's free will decision to represent himself,'74 which
Faretta indicated should occur only after a defendant is made fully
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,' 7 5 a
defendant like Oreye, who fails to actually elect self-representation and
who is never informed of the dangers and disadvantages of doing so,
76
should not be forced to proceed in that manner.
An additional flaw with Oreye's reasoning, which posits that a
person necessarily chooses the last of three options by rejecting the first
and second, is in disregarding the possibility of a fourth option:
appointment of substitute counsel (in this instance, to represent Oreye in
lieu of Shanin). Moreover, Oreye's reasoning would presumably lead to
a different result had the court simply re-ordered the three options it
171. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670-71 (citations omitted).
172. As the trial court explained, Oreye asked Shanin to withdraw because, according to
Oreye, with only two weeks left before trial, Shanin revealed to Oreye that he had developed no
defense for trial and tried to persuade Oreye to change his plea to guilty. Oreye, 1999 WL 558127,
at *2 n. 1.
173. Oreye, 263 F.3d at 671-72.
174. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1974) ("[F]orcing a lawyer upon an
unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.").
175. See id at 835 ("When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely
factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason,
in order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently' forgo those
relinquished benefits.").
176. See, e.g., United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1982) (describing a
proper Faretta warning as requiring the district court to advise the defendant of the technical
problems he may encounter in acting as his own attorney and of the risks he takes if his defense
efforts are unsuccessful, including, for example, instruction that the defendant will have to conduct
his defense in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, rules with
which he may not be familiar; that the defendant may be hampered in presenting his best defense by
his lack of knowledge of the law; and that the effectiveness of his defense may be diminished by his
dual role as attorney and accused); City of Tacoma v. Bishop, 920 P.2d 214, 217-221 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1996) (recognizing that a defendant may forfeit the right to counsel but concluding that the
trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the defendant to proceed pro se without warning
him of the consequences).
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presented. Under Oreye's logic, had the trial court first offered Oreye
the options of representing himself or finding another lawyer, and
had Oreye rejected those two options, his "choice" would have
necessarily become the only remaining option: staying with Shanin.
Under the circumstances, it would have been just as simple for the trial
court to deny Shanin's motion to withdraw and require Oreye to defend
exclusively with Shanin's assistance, and doing so would have
guaranteed a more effective defense for Oreye, thereby generating a
more legitimate outcome.
On facts similar to Oreye, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Meeks reversed a conviction upon finding that the defendant was denied
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which occurred when the trial
court simultaneously denied his motion to substitute counsel while
granting his appointed counsel's motion to withdraw, effectively
"waiv[ing] Meeks' right to counsel for him."' 77 According to Meeks, the
trial court should have either denied counsel's motion to withdraw,
leaving Meeks represented; appointed a new attorney to represent him;
or permitted Meeks to clearly and affirmatively elect pro se
representation. 78 In the Ninth Circuit's view, the trial court erred in
failing to employ any of these options, instead forcing Meeks to proceed
pro se despite no clear election of that right.' 79 Under the Oreye
approach, the trial court in Meeks would not have erred.
Because an indigent defendant has a right to competent counsel, but
no right to a particular counsel of his choosing, courts facing scenarios
like Oreye and Meeks would arguably be justified in refusing to appoint
substitute counsel.18 ° Even eliminating that option, however, courts in
such cases still have the option of requiring representation by the
defendant's original appointed counsel, a scenario that is usually
superior to forcing an accused to defend himself on the eve of trial
despite little desire or ability to do so. With nothing more than a mere
difference in opinion regarding trial strategy between the defendant and
his appointed counsel, courts facing such scenarios should focus more
broadly on the Sixth Amendment's fair trial guarantee and not require an
accused to defend himself unless that is his choice.

177. See United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989) (recognizing
that defendants do not have a "Sixth Amendment right to choose their counsel" and declaring that
"[t]he [Sixth] Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate
representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable
complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts").
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4. Strong Preference for Counsel's Assistance
A recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, United
States v. Duetan, adopted the most desirable approach for these cases
and, like this Article's proposal, ratifies a strong preference for
representation by counsel. 81
In Ductan, in facts reminiscent of Oreye, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals found the lower court to have erred in ruling that defendant
Phillip Ductan forfeited his right to counsel. 82 Similar to Oreye, Ductan
was initially represented by an attorney named Charles Brant, but Brant
filed a motion to withdraw as Ductan's attorney. 83 At a hearing on
Brant's motion, the magistrate judge confirmed that Ductan no longer
wanted Brant to represent him and explained that Ductan's options were
to (1) represent himself, (2) hire new counsel, or (3) ask the court to
appoint counsel." 8 At this point, "Ductan began making nonsense
statements," requesting "a form 226 form," and stating that he was "a
secured party creditor."' 8 5 After the prosecutor informed Ductan of the
charges and maximum penalties, he responded, "I do not understand
what he is saying. I'm only here for settlement of the account."' 86 The
magistrate judge then found that Ductan had "forfeited his right to
counsel" as a result of his "nonsense statements," despite acknowledging
187
that he "had not knowingly and intelligently waived" that right.
At a subsequent hearing, the magistrate judge reiterated that
Ductan had waived his right to counsel, leaving only two options: to
' Ductan later informed
"hire a lawyer or represent himself."188
the court
that he was seeking private counsel and "could not properly represent
[him]self," and made additional statements about being a "secured
'
party creditor."189
Jury selection began the following day with Ductan representing
himself with the aid of standby counsel, Randy Lee. 9 ° At the start of
jury selection, Ductan made additional nonsense statements and
informed the court that the "defense is not prepared right now to move

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

800 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id. The magistrate judge directed the federal defender to remain as standby counsel for

Ductan. Id.
188. Id.

189. Id. at 645-46 (alteration in original).
190. Id. at 646.
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forward with any proceedings."'' The court then held Ductan in
contempt and removed him from the courtroom until the end of jury
selection, at which point Ductan again informed the court that he "d[id]
not want to represent [him]self, . . . would like to seek private counsel,"
and did not want standby counsel, Randy Lee, to assume the role of
appointed counsel.' 9 2 At this point, if trial were to continue as scheduled,
a decision had to be made for Ductan: self-representation, which he had
expressly rejected, or representation by Ductan's standby counsel, which
he had also expressly rejected. The court imposed self-representation,
and Ductan was convicted of the charges against him.' 93
On appeal, Ductan argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel when the magistrate judge found that he forfeited his
right to counsel by his conduct. 194 The court agreed. Acknowledging that
"the right to self-representation is inescapably in tension with the right to
counsel,"' 95 the court declared that "the right to counsel is preeminent
and hence, the default position," in part because access to counsel
"affects a defendant's ability to assert any other rights he may have."' 96
The court further noted that it had "never held that counsel can be
relinquished by means short of [a defendant's knowing and voluntary]
waiver"' 97 and had instructed lower courts to "indulge in every
reasonable presumption" against that option. 198 Thus, despite the fact
that Ductan had created "an undeniably difficult position"'199 by taking
inconsistent positions-declaring that he did not wish to represent
himself while adamantly refusing appointed counsel-the court held that
the magistrate judge erred in finding that Ductan had forfeited his right
to counsel. 00 Because the error was not harmless, the court vacated
Ductan's conviction and remanded for a new trial.2 01

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. Like in Oreye, the court permitted standby counsel Randy Lee to assist Ductan in his
defense as needed. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 649.
196. Id.
197. See id. (noting disagreement with other courts holding that the right to counsel may be
relinquished either intentionally or unintentionally).
198. Id. (quoting Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1029 (4th Cir. 1995)).
199. Ductan, 800 F.3d at 651.
200. Id. at 653.
201. Id. (noting that denial of counsel is a structural error that is not subject to harmless error
analysis).
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THE "TIMELY" REQUEST REQUIREMENT

Most courts require a defendant to request pro se representation "in
a timely manner."2 °2 Thus, even when a defendant makes a clear and
unequivocal request to represent himself, a court may deny the request if
untimely.20 3 Courts across the country have considered at what stage in
the trial proceedings a request for self-representation is waived as
untimely. 2" As with the obstructionist defendant who does not clearly
choose between the right to self-representation and the right to counsel's
assistance, there is no uniform solution to this issue. Moreover, courts
have held that automatic reversal is warranted where a trial court
205
improperly denies a pro se request as untimely.
In deciding what makes a pro se request timely, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held, consistent with most courts, that a defendant
must have a last clear chance to assert his right to self-representation
before the jury has been empaneled and trial has commenced (unless the
court finds the request a tactic to secure delay).20 6 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has similarly determined that a defendant's request to
proceed pro se is timely if made before meaningful trial proceedings
have begun. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has determined that reversible error
occurs when a trial court denies a defendant's clear and unequivocal
request to proceed pro se made the day before trial, noting that such
requests made before the jury is empaneled are "timely as a matter of
law," unless they are a tactic to secure delay. 0 7 Other courts, including
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, agree with
this approach.20 8
202. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000).
203. See United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808 (8th Cit. 2006).
204. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1977) ("If the denial of
self-representation as untimely asserted was error we must reverse.").
206. See id. at 893 ("In the interest of minimizing disruptions and maintaining continuity at
trial, most courts of appeals have established the rule that the fundamental right to conduct the case
pro se must be claimed before the trial begins."); see also United States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 520
(5th Cir. 2001) ("The district court was not obliged to honor Davis's mid-trial request to represent
himself.").
207. See Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 555-56, 556 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing
defendant's conviction in a habeas case in part because the trial court denied defendant's numerous
unambiguous requests to represent himself, which were made well before trial, and finding that
defendant's final request, made on the eve of trial, was not made for purposes of delay).
208. See United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that once a
trial begins, it is within the trial court's discretion whether to allow the defendant to dismiss counsel
and proceed pro se, noting that "a defendant does not have an absolute right to dismiss counsel and
conduct his own defense after the trial has commenced"); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d
1113, 1123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The bulk of the cases cited to us ... do no more than apply the
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The reasons underlying the general trial commencement rule are
simple. Once the jury has been empaneled and trial has begun, trial
courts should have the ability to deny mid-trial requests to proceed pro
se in order to minimize disruptions, avoid inconvenience and delay,
maintain continuity in representation, and avoid confusing the jury.20 9
An alternative approach among courts is to require any request to
proceed pro se to be made "within a reasonable time prior to the day on
which the trial begins," thereby making day-of-trial requests untimely.210
As one court explained: "[n]one of the interests involved here, the right
of self-representation, the right to counsel, or the interest in preserving
an orderly criminal process, are furthered by the allowance of a last
minute request such as [one] made [on the morning of trial]." Also,
according to this court, "day of trial assertions of the self-representation
right are likely to lead to a rushed procedure, increasing the chances that
the case should be reversed because some vital interest of the defendant
' In addition, such last minute requests
was not adequately protected."2 11
negatively impact the orderly administration of the courts. According to
one court, "[d]ay of trial assertions of the self-representation right,
whether before or after empaneling of the jury, disrupt the time
schedules of judges, counsel, and potential jurors, all who have been
assembled for the occasion and who can be [re]assembled only at the
' They also disrupt the schedules of
expense of extra time and money."212
other matters on the court's docket, which have been planned around the
present trial.213
V.

UNIFORM PROPOSAL FOR THE OBSTRUCTIONIST DEFENDANT

Instances where a trial court suspects a defendant is deliberately
manipulating the Sixth Amendment and attempting to inject error into
recognized principle that the fundamental right to conduct the case pro se is one that must be
claimed timely, before the trial begins.... When the pro se right is claimed after trial has begun, the
court exercises its discretion [in deciding whether to grant or deny the request]."); United States ex
rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that if defendants "clearly sought
to represent themselves, after their cases had been called on the calendar but before the jury had
been chosen, they had an unqualified right to have their requests granted [because] [a]t this stage
there was no danger of disrupting proceedings already in progress" (footnote omitted)).
209. Dunlap, 577 F.2d at 868.
210. See Russell v. State, 383 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. 1978) (noting disagreement among the
courts about how the timeliness requisite is to be applied, and recognizing two approaches to the
issue, one which holds that an assertion of the right of self-representation is timely if it is made
"before the jury is empaneled and sworn," and the other finding such an assertion timely only when
made "within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial").
211. Id.
212. Id. at 315.
213. Id.
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the record present unique challenges for courts. The variety of
approaches courts have adopted to deal with these issues has created
uncertainty in this area and only heightens the twin dangers of erroneous
conviction, due to inadequate representation at trial, and reversal of an
otherwise warranted conviction on appeal, due to a perceived Farettaor
Gideon error where the evidence is otherwise sufficient to affirm.
Although some scholars contend there is no "one-size-fits-all" solution
214
for these cases, a more uniform approach to the issue is warranted.
A. Proposal
Rather than being forced to participate in the defendant's game all
the way through the start of trial, where only then a court may
confidently deny a request for self-representation as untimely, a trial
court faced with an unruly defendant should instead be permitted to
make a factual fimding, based on a preponderance of evidence, that the
defendant is intentionally refusing to make a clear choice between the
right to counsel and the right to self-representation. Such a finding could
be made at any point before trial but must be justified by the defendant's
deliberately obstructionist or dilatory conduct prior to that point, which
should be reflected in the record.
Once the factual finding is made, the court would then be justified
in making the Sixth Amendment election for the defendant. In the usual
case, the choice should be representation by counsel, subject only to an
exception for cases where a defendant has physically or verbally abused
his appointed counsel, at which point substitute counsel should be
appointed. If and when a court must step into the shoes of the
obstructionist defendant and substitute its judgment for the defendant's,
assistance of counsel should be the near universal remedy.
A critical aspect of this proposal is that once the court makes the
requisite factual finding and resolves the representation issue for the
defendant, the defendant's right to choose among his Sixth Amendment
rights would completely terminate. This requirement is necessary to
prevent further manipulation of the competing rights and is justified by
the notion that the defendant has forfeited his right to elect his
representation path once the factual finding is made.
Finally, the abuse of discretion standard should apply to any Sixth
Amendment argument a convicted defendant makes on appeal. For
214. See Gerwig-Moore, supra note 96, at 444 ("[W]hile no one-size-fits-all answers will
magically clarify puzzles that have perplexed a number of state and federal appellate judges, there is
enough of a problem here to warrant some study, organized thinking, and perhaps even modification
of existing approaches.").
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defendants who appeal a conviction, the trial court's factual finding and
decision on the representation issue should stand, absent a clear abuse of
discretion proven only by a lack of evidence of actual obstructionist
conduct by the defendant.
B.

The TriggeringCondition:Intentionally Obstructionistor
Dilatory Conduct

Under this Article's proposal, a trial court faced with obstructionist
misconduct may find that a defendant has forfeited his right to represent
himself through his wrongdoing, but only if the court makes the
following two findings, each based on a preponderance of evidence:
first, that the defendant has engaged in misconduct of an obstructionist
or dilatory nature; and second, that the defendant has done so with
the intent to delay the proceedings, obstruct the judicial process, or
create reversible error for purposes of securing a new trial on appeal.
As explained below, distinct act and intent requirements bring the
instant proposal in line with the related doctrine of forfeiture-bywrongdoing, which requires evidence of both an act of wrongdoing
directed at a would-be witness, along with the specific intent of
preventing the witness from testifying-as in cases where a defendant
has bribed or intimidated a potential witness to prevent her from
testifying against the defendant." 5
Determining a defendant's true intent is often difficult, and as the
criminal law has long recognized, is sometimes only capable of being
inferred from one's conduct.216 Despite these difficulties, certain
common types of misbehavior should permit a court to infer that a
defendant is intentionally obstructing or delaying the proceedings,
thereby triggering the proposed factual findings.
Upon review of the cases outlined in Part IlH, above, at least six
factors emerge as ones that might justify a trial court's finding
of deliberate obstruction.217 The first factor is whether the defendant
at issue has been charged with obstruction-related crimes, as with
Hansen, who had been charged with criminal contempt for having
215. See infra Part V.E.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
government, in a criminal prosecution, "was permitted to prove the intent element of the [criminal]
charge with circumstantial evidence, which is often the only available evidence of a defendant's
mental state"); see also Marc McAllister, Down but Not Out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing Still Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 393, 431-33 (2009) (examining cases where a
defendant's intent to silence a potential witness was inferred from the wrongdoer's conduct under
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the right of confrontation).
217. See supra Part 1H.
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willfully disobeyed a grand jury subpoena directing him to appear to
provide handwriting samples and fingerprints.2 18 Other, similar crimes
might include those relating to witness intimidation and bribery,
particularly those committed to obstruct a pending criminal investigation
or prosecution.
The second factor is whether the defendant at issue, as in Hansen's
case, has informed the court of his desire to present frivolous arguments
his appointed counsel refuses to make and, to accomplish that objective
without entirely losing the benefits of counsel's assistance, vacillates
between the competing Sixth Amendment rights.
A third factor is whether a defendant represented by counsel has
filed multiple pro se motions even after the court has instructed him not
to do so, as such conduct reveals the defendant's indifference to the
court's instructions and a general disrespect for the judicial process.
A fourth factor is the defendant's use of tactics that secure delay,
including hiring and firing multiple attorneys, making conflicting
statements to force continuations of hearings or trials, and peppering the
court with lengthy motions advancing frivolous arguments.
A fifth factor, noted in Hardy, is whether the defendant is well
educated and able to invoke complex case law, which, unlike defendants
who unwittingly engage in similar obstructionist behavior, is an
indication that the defendant's obstructionist actions are intentional.2 19
Factors that may weigh against a finding of intentional obstruction
include mental health issues and nonsensical behavior, which might
cause a court to conclude that the defendant's obstructionist behavior is
really not intentional, particularly where the defendant is not well
educated. In such situations, rather than going forward to trial with
appointed counsel, the court should ensure the defendant is truly capable
of making the requisite Sixth Amendment election and, in extreme cases,
actually competent to stand trial.
As with various criminal procedure concepts, such as the notion of
probable cause, this Article's proposed framework is a totality of
circumstances test where no one factor is dispositive, but where certain
factors remain highly relevant to the analysis.22 ° Ultimately, only a trial
218. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
219. See United States v. Hardy, 941 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1991).
220. Under Fourth Amendment law, the test for whether probable cause exists is based on the
totality of circumstances where no one factor is dispositive, but where certain factors remain highly
relevant to the analysis. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-39 (1983) (adopting the totality of
circumstances test for determining probable cause and discussing its advantages over the previous,
two-pronged test). Similarly, in determining whether a private person should be deemed an agent of
the government for Fourth Amendment purposes, courts examine the degree of government
involvement in the situation in light of the totality of circumstances but focus primarily on two
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judge who actually interacts with a defendant like Hansen, often in
several hearings occurring over a lengthy period of time, is capable of
making the findings necessary to trigger forfeiture of the selfrepresentation right.
C. Advantages of This Proposal
In a practical way, the framework this Article proposes permits
courts to distinguish between a defendant's sincere desire to represent
himself, which would result in pro se representation, and a defendant's
effort to obstruct the court, which would result in the proposed factual
findings and consequent representation by counsel.22 ' The primary
advantage of this proposal is the certainty it creates for both trial and
appellate courts in dealing with the obstructionist defendant. Under this
proposal, before pro se representation would be permitted, defendants
will be required to clearly and unequivocally request to proceed pro se,
to do so in a timely manner, and to affirmatively demonstrate a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel upon being
fully advised of the dangers of self-representation.2 22 As the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has held, all of these requirements are absolute,
which would in turn create greater certainty by allowing the court "to
presume that 'the defendant should proceed with counsel absent an
unmistakable expression by the defendant that so to proceed is contrary
223
to his wishes. ,,
Mandating firm waiver requirements also blocks a skillful
defendant from manipulating the court.22 4 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "[t]he flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary
standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. '22 5 To
alleviate this concern, once the proposed factual findings are made,
the defendant forfeit the ability to make the Sixth Amendment election,
and consequently, lose the means to obstruct the proceedings.22 6 In the
factors: (1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct at issue and (2)
whether the party performing the conduct at issue intended to assist law enforcement or, rather,
intended to further his own ends. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989);
Bryan R. Lemons, Public Education and Student Privacy:Application of the FourthAmendment to
Dormitoriesat Public Colleges and Universities, 2012 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 31, 43-46 (2012).
221. See United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791,808-09 (8th Cir. 2006).
222. See supra Part V.A.
223. United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 650 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fields v. Murray, 49
F.3d 1024, 1029 (4th Cir. 1995)).
224. See id. at 649-50.
225. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
226. Courts have recognized the importance of refusing to cooperate in a criminal defendant's
obstructionist game. See, e.g., State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) ("[T]he
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usual case, defendants also lose the means to secure reversible error
on appeal, further prohibiting defendants from profiting from their
own wrongdoing.227
This Article's proposal also promotes judicial economy and the
prompt administration of justice. By enabling courts to prevent an
obstructionist defendant from changing his mind on the representation
issue once the requisite factual findings are made, courts would be better
positioned to proceed to trial more expeditiously. When more and more
obstructionist-minded defendants are precluded from engaging in
obstructionist behavior as a result of the factual findings this Article
proposes, the very misconduct that has generated this dilemma would
subside. 228 As a result, the tactic of injecting error into the record
through ambiguous actions, equivocal comments, and dilatory tactics
will fade away as defendants discover that such tactics no longer
have promise.229
Perhaps most importantly, this Article's proposal accounts for the
acknowledged truth that self-representation is almost always inferior to
counsel's assistance. The fact that an appointed defense attorney is
typically better suited to defend an individual charged with a serious
criminal offense cannot reasonably be disputed. The Benchbookfor U.S.
District Court Judges, for example, recommends the following warning
for pro se defendants:
I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer would
defend you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it is
unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with
the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not
most appropriate response to the type of cynical manipulation of the right to counsel engaged in by
[defendant] is to refuse to allow the manipulation, in the sense that the defendant should not be
provided with the advantage sought.").
227. Cf Allen, 397 U.S. at 345 (stating that "[a] court must guard against allowing a defendant
to profit from his own wrong" by manipulating his Sixth Amendment rights).
228. See supra Part V.A-B.
229. Cf United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427, 1442 (M.D. Pa. 1994) ("[lt should be
added that [defendant's] attempt to substitute counsel was a transparent attempt to use the right to
counsel to manipulate the judicial system and delay trial. It is part of a pattern of attempts at
manipulation by inmates of [the prison] appearing before the court."). For the same reasons, the
author's proposal eliminates ambiguity for courts in responding to defendants who attempt to
invoke their right to pro se represeatation during trial.See Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886,
894 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to decide how to treat the right to defend pro se when it is asserted
during trial but recognizing that clarification is needed in the circuit); see also United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (setting forth factors courts should consider in
determining whether to grant pro se requests made after trial has commenced, including the
inconvenience threatened by defendant's belated request, the potential prejudice to the defendant in

denying the request, the circumstances at the time, whether defendant has engaged in prior
disruptive behavior, and whether the trial is in an advanced stage).
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familiar with the rules
of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to
230
represent yourself.
Along with ensuring that a defendant is not convicted on the strength of
inadmissible or unreliable evidence, which the rules of evidence are
often designed to prevent, 23 1 an attorney is vital to ensuring a fair trial
because an attorney, as compared to a pro se litigant, will better ensure
that other critical constitutional rights are upheld. 232 For example, an
attorney who understands the complex law governing the Sixth
Amendment's right of confrontation will better ensure that a defendant is
not convicted on presumptively unreliable evidence.233 This idea was
expressed by the Supreme Court of Arizona in a recent en banc opinion
concerning the right to counsel on appeal, which declared:
[The defendant] should be aware that proceeding without counsel in a
capital appeal will be extraordinarily difficult. In many respects, this
appeal may be the defendant's last meaningful opportunity to
challenge his convictions and death sentence. If he represents himself,
[defendant] will be required to examine the record of his criminal
case, identify constitutional or other infirmities in the criminal
proceedings against him, and make complex legal arguments to this
court. Without the assistance
of counsel, the obstacles to success may
234
well be insurmountable.

In addition to a defendant's general incompetence in trying cases, a
defendant's effectiveness in presenting his own defense may be
diminished by his dual role as attorney and accused.235 In some
230.

FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHIBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 7 (6th ed. 2013).

231.

The rules regarding authentication, for example, are designed to ensure that only genuine

and authentic items of evidence are admitted at trial. See FED. R. EviD. 901(a). Likewise, relevancy

rules contemplate the exclusion of certain otherwise admissible evidence where the item's probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, and other similar dangers. See FED. R. EviD. 403; see also FED. R. EvD. 102 ("These rules
should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.").
232. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997) (recognizing that the "vast body of [constitutional
criminal procedure] law depends for its enforcement on criminal defense counsel, the private
attorneys general of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments"). But see Pamela R. Metzger, Fear
of Adversariness: Using Gideon to Restrict Defendants' Invocation of Adversary Procedures, 122
YALE L.J. 2550, 2559-70 (2013) (arguing that the constitutional right to counsel guaranteed by
Gideon actually minimizes the invocation of certain adversarial rights by empowering attorneys,
rather than defendants, to control them).
233. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause's
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence.").
234. State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 875 (Ariz. 2004).
235. See McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 945 (3d Cir. 1987).
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instances, such as with alleged crimes involving no eyewitnesses and no
victims (e.g., tax evasion crimes), defendants are best equipped to
provide critical evidence on the issue of their own innocence. Separating
the roles of advocate and accused helps ensure that any evidence the
defendant is able to present on the issue of his own culpability will not
go unheard.
Finally, by enabling courts to cut off a defendant's ability to
obstruct judicial proceedings much earlier in the proceedings than
currently permitted by the case law relating to timeliness, this Article's
proposal prevents the judicial system from being degraded by
obstructionist-minded defendants and upholds the integrity of the courts.
As the Supreme Court has declared:
[O]ur courts... cannot be treated disrespectfully with impunity.
Nor can the accused be permitted by his disruptive conduct indefinitely
to avoid being tried on the charges brought against him. It would
degrade our country and our judicial system to permit our courts to
be bullied, insulted, and humiliated and their orderly progress
thwarted and obstructed by defendants brought before them charged
with crimes .... [I]f our courts are to remain what the Founders
intended, the citadels of justice, their proceedings cannot and must
not be infected with [a defendant's] scurrilous, abusive language
236
and conduct ....
A potential objection to this Article's proposal is that it restrains the
freedom of defendants to choose self-representation and control matters
of defense strategy. This objection is unfounded. First, this Article's
proposal governs only a narrow slice of cases-for example, those
involving an obstructionist or delay-minded defendant. Under this
proposal, defendants will remain free to elect self-representation all the
way up to the start of trial, as long as they do not manipulate this right in
order to create reversible error or obstruct the proceedings. Thus,
defendants who are truly dissatisfied with counsel or who desire to
control their defense remain free to elect self-representation. Second,
even in the unusual case involving the obstructionist defendant, such
defendants will have already exercised their free will by choosing not to
elect either Sixth Amendment right but to instead obstruct the judicial
process. To the extent such a defendant's free will is "obstructed," it is
only due to the return of the defendant's own obstructionist boomerang.
Third, under this Article's proposal, an accused who is represented by
counsel will retain ultimate authority, as he does in every case, to make
certain fundamental decisions regarding his defense, including whether
236.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970).
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to plead guilty, whether to waive his right to a jury trial, and whether to
testify on his own behalf. 237 Finally, the increased use of appointed
counsel in such cases will reduce the potential for erroneous convictions,
and there is no better way to curtail a defendant's freedom than to
place him behind bars. In sum, the minimal restraint on freedom
of choice necessary to prevent obstructionist behavior is a small price
to pay for greater clarity in this area and a reduced likelihood of
erroneous convictions.
D. ProposedExceptionfor Cases of Verbal or Physical Abuse
An exceptional line of cases are those where a defendant has
physically abused or verbally threatened his appointed counsel with
physical harm. In such cases, rather than immediately resorting to pro se
representation, trial courts should first appoint special counsel who have
training and experience in handling unruly defendants.
Under this Article's proposal, any time a trial court is compelled
to appoint substitute counsel as a result of severe obstructionist
conduct by the defendant, there should be a corresponding tolling of
the Speedy Trial Act, and a continuance of trial for whatever period
of time is reasonably necessary for substitute counsel to prepare for
trial-typically in thirty day increments depending on the complexity of
the case. This tolling would be justified by a provision of the federal
Speedy Trial Act, which excludes, for purposes of computing the time
within which a criminal trial must commence, "[a]ny period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by any judge... if the judge
granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of
justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial."2'38 It would also be justified
by the law relating to the granting of continuances, which generally
gives trial courts discretion regarding whether to grant or deny a
continuance of trial.2 39
Nevertheless, if there is any evidence that a defendant, after being
appointed substitute counsel, continues his abusive behavior toward his
second appointed attorney, the court should then be permitted to find
that the defendant has entirely forfeited his right to counsel. Although
237. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (2012).
239. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("In the course of trial, after due
appointment of competent counsel, many procedural questions necessarily arise which must be
decided by the trial judge in the light of facts then presented and conditions then existing.
Disposition of a request for continuance is of this nature and is made in the discretion of the trial
judge, the exercise of which will ordinarily not be reviewed.").
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forfeiture of the right to counsel should be rare, it would be justified in
the case of a defendant's repeated abuse of the very person appointed to
assist his defense.
Courts have had little trouble applying the concept of forfeiture
of the right to counsel in this context. In a particularly egregious
case, United States v. Leggett, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's ruling that a criminal defendant had forfeited
his right to counsel at sentencing after he punched his attorney in
the head in open court and choked, scratched, and spit on him while
he lay supine on the floor.2 4 Likewise, in State v. Lehman, the Court
of Appeals of Minnesota held that a defendant forfeited his right
to counsel by attacking his attorney in open court, punching him
repeatedly and causing him serious injuries.241 Other courts have
similarly applied the forfeiture rationale in cases involving physical
attacks of appointed counsel.242
Courts have likewise found that extreme verbal threats toward
appointed counsel justify forfeiture of the right to counsel. In United
States v. Thompson, for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a defendant's threat to kill his appointed counsel was
sufficient to permit counsel to withdraw and to further refuse to appoint
substitute counsel.243 Other courts have reached the same result in cases
of serious verbal abuse, even where such behavior does not involve
threats of violence. 2 "
240. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 240, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1998).
241. See State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 81-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (relying on the
holdings of courts in similar cases to find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that defendant had forfeited his right to counsel by attacking his public defender in
open court).
242. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 93-100 (2d Cir. 2001) (ruling that habeas
petitioner had not been unconstitutionally deprived of counsel during a sentencing hearing based on
a state court finding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by punching his attorney in the
head).
243. 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2003). Regarding the refusal to appoint substitute counsel, the
court stated that "[i]n light of the seriousness of the allegation, and [defendant's] willful failure to
submit any explanation or to otherwise refute the allegation, our refusal to appoint substitute
counsel did not unconstitutionally abridge [defendant's] right to be represented on appeal." Id.
244. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (1lth Cir. 1995) (finding
defendant had forfeited his right to counsel based on testimony of defendant's second appointed
attorney that defendant was "verbally abusive," threatened to harm and sue him, and tried to
persuade him to engage in unethical conduct; nevertheless, the court was "troubled by the fact that
McLeod was not warned that his misbehavior might lead to pro se representation"); United States v.
Travers, 996 F. Supp. 6, 17 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding forfeiture as a result of the defendant's
"persistently abusive, threatening and coercive" dealings with his attorney, and noting that the
defendant had been repeatedly warned that his failure to cooperate could result in a finding of
forfeiture); Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 766 (Del. 2006) (finding defendant forfeited his right to
counsel by use of "continuing profanity and insulting conduct directed toward his counsel ... and
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These decisions are undoubtedly correct. As compared to less
egregious misconduct, such as delay caused by a defendant's mere
indecision on the representation issue, forfeiture of the right to counsel is
appropriate in cases involving physical violence, threats of violence, or
extreme verbal abuse towards appointed counsel due to the obvious rift
such conduct creates between a defendant and his attorney. Moreover,
forfeiture of the right to counsel in this particular context "is the most
effective means of deterring repetition of such conduct" by criminal
defendants. 4 5 Although forfeiture of the right to counsel should be
rarely imposed, it is appropriate here.
E. Forfeiture: The Better Rationale
Courts that have addressed the effect of a defendant's obstructionist
behavior on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the right to selfrepresentation have applied theories of "waiver," "forfeiture," and a
'
hybrid of the two, "waiver by conduct."246
Waiver is a common concept in criminal law and typically requires
evidence of a knowing and intentional relinquishment of a constitutional
right.24 7 The most common method of "waiving a constitutional right is
by an affirmative, verbal request," such as, in this particular context, a
defendant who clearly and unequivocally requests to relinquish his right
to counsel and to represent himself instead.248 Unlike waiver, forfeiture
involves the loss of a right regardless of whether the defendant intended
to relinquish it. 249 In the context of the Sixth Amendment as a whole,
which contains various rights designed to assure a fair trial,250 forfeiture
has been applied to strip criminal defendants of their Sixth Amendment

his refusal to make peace with counsel," contrary to the trial court's instructions, even though
defendant's behavior fell short of violence or threats of violence but cautioning that "forfeiture of
the right to counsel is an extraordinary circumstance not established by mere disagreements between
client and counsel"); People v. Sloane, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that
"defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive,
obstreperous, and uncooperative behavior" towards four successive appointed attorneys); State v.
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 549-50 (Tenn. 2000) (finding that defendant had forfeited his right to
counsel where defendant was appointed three sets of counsel, repeatedly demanded that counsel
withdraw and that new counsel be appointed, and verbally attacked and threatened his last appointed
counsel personally, as well as counsels' office staff and family members).
245. Lehman, 749 N.w.2d at 82.
246. See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-1103 (3d Cir. 1995).
247. See id at 1099; see also Metzger, supra note 232, at 2556-57 (explaining that
fundamental criminal procedure rights are so personal to the accused that only the accused can
waive them, which requires a defendant's intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right).
248. Goldberg,67 F.3d at 1099.
249. Id. at 1100.
250. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979).
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right to confront an out-of-court declarant-and hence to object on
grounds that the declarant is unavailable to be cross-examined at trialwhere evidence shows that the defendant intentionally caused the
declarant's absence from trial (as in, for example, a case of witness
intimidation).2 51 Some courts have applied the concept of "waiver by
conduct," a hybrid of waiver and forfeiture, in cases where a defendant
has been warned that he will lose his right to counsel if he engages in
dilatory tactics-such as disregarding the court's2 2 instructions to hire
counsel where he has the financial ability to do so.
The key distinction between waiver and forfeiture is the element of
intentional choice.25 3 Although courts have applied the concept of
"waiver by conduct" in instances where a court is forced to resolve the
representation issue for the defendant due to the defendant's indecision,
the lack of an intentional election of either competing right by the
defendant makes forfeiture the more appropriate rationale. As the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted:
In many situations there will be defendants who engage in dilatory
conduct but who vehemently object to being forced to proceed pro se.
These defendants cannot truly be said to be "waiving" their Sixth
Amendment rights because although they are voluntarily engaging in
misconduct knowing what they
stand to lose, they are not affirmatively
25 4
requesting to proceed pro se.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly determined whether
forfeiture or waiver is the appropriate concept to apply in the case of
a defendant who manipulates the Sixth Amendment representation
rights, the Court's precedents on related Sixth Amendment issues are

251. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-60 (2008); see also Commonwealth v.
Szerlong, 933 N.E.2d 633, 638 (Mass. 2010) (analyzing the wrongdoing requirement of the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, and noting that "[a] defendant's involvement in procuring a
witness's unavailability need not consist of a criminal act;" but rather, all that is required is an
intentional act of making or helping the witness to become unavailable to testify, such as colluding
with the witness to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial).
252. See Goldberg,67 F.3d at 1100 (citing United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir.
1992)).
253. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249-50 (3rd Cir. 1998) (discussing the
distinction between waiver and forfeiture and noting that "forfeiture 'results in the loss of a right
regardless of... whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right' (quoting Goldberg, 67
F.3d at 1100)).
254. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101; see also Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 763-65 (Del. 2006)
("If a defendant's behavior is sufficiently egregious, it will constitute forfeiture. Forfeiture, unlike
waiver, does not require Farettawarnings or a warning to discontinue bad conduct. 'Forfeiture can
be found "regardless of whether the defendant has been warned about engaging in misconduct, and
regardless of whether the defendant has been advised of the risks of proceeding pro se.""' (quoting
United States v. Thomas 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004)).
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instructive.2 55 For example, in Illinois v. Allen, the Court considered
whether a trial court could remove an unruly defendant from court
without violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be present at
trial.256 Despite acknowledging that "[o]ne of the most basic of the rights
guaranteed by the [Sixth Amendment] is the accused's right to be
present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial," the Court held that it
is constitutionally permissible to remove a defendant from court as a
result of his extreme, obstructionist behavior. 7
Similarly, in Giles v. California, the Supreme Court determined
that a defendant may forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to confront
adverse witnesses through the defendant's own wrongdoing.25 8 In Giles,
the Court held that the Confrontation Clause's forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception requires both an act of wrongdoing directed at a would-be
witness coupled with the specific intent of preventing the potential
witness from testifying, such as murdering a prosecution witness
specifically to prevent her from testifying at a subsequent trial.259 Along
the way, the Court ratified the "broad forfeiture principles" that
underlined the exception at common law, stating, for example, that
"[t]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the
legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts, ' 260 and that the
rule permitting forfeiture of the confrontation right "'has its foundation'
in the principle that no one should be permitted to take advantage of
his wrong. "261
The same combination of wrongful act and specific intent mandated
by Giles is required under this Article's proposal, which rests on the
255. Indeed, the Court's statements in this regard have at times been conflicting or confusing.
See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 894-95 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("The Court uses the tenr 'waive' instead of 'forfeit.' The two are really
not the same, although our cases have so often used them interchangeably that it may be too late to
introduce precision. Waiver, the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege,' is merely one means by which a forfeiture may occur. Some rights may be forfeited by
means short of waiver, but others may not [including the right to counsel]. A right that cannot be
waived cannot be forfeited by other means (at least in the same proceeding), but the converse is not
true." (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).
256. 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
257. See id. at 338, 343-47. The court concluded that defendant "lost his right guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to be present throughout his trial" due to his extreme unruly
conduct in court. Id. at 346.
258. 554 U.S. 353, 359-60 (2008).
259. See id at 358-68 (examining whether the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the
confrontation right requires proof that the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the
target witness from testifying); see also Carlson v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 791 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th
Cir. 2015) (discussing the Giles actus reus and mens rea requirements at length).
260. Giles, 554 U.S. at 366 (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 158 (1878)).
261. Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159).
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same underlying equitable principles. Under this Article's proposal, a
trial court faced with obstructionist misconduct may find that a
defendant has forfeited his right to represent himself through his
wrongdoing but only if the court first finds, based on a preponderance of
evidence, that the defendant (1) has engaged in misconduct of an
obstructionist or dilatory nature; and (2) has done so with the intent to
delay the proceedings, obstruct the judicial process, or create reversible
error for purposes of securing a new trial on appeal. Once the requisite
factual findings are made, the same type of deference owed to the trial
court's finding that is due under Giles would also be due on appeal. 62
Clearly articulating the basis for this ruling as forfeiture, rather than
waiver, has practical implications. First, as the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has recognized, forfeiture can occur either when a defendant is
informed of the likely consequences of his misconduct, such as when he
has been warned that his dilatory conduct may result in the loss of his
right to represent himself, or when he is not so informed, such as when
a court deems the defendant to have forfeited his right to selfrepresentation without first advising him of that possibility. By analogy,
nothing in Giles requires the court to first educate a defendant likely to
engage in witness intimidation of the consequences of doing so; what
matters is the defendant's action and intent, not whether the defendant
was warned ahead of time that his obstructionist behavior might cause
him to forfeit his right to confront the would be witness. In the instant
scenario, regardless of whether the court informs the defendant of the
likely consequences of his actions, forfeiture still justifies the findings
this Article proposes.
Second, a finding of forfeiture does not require the court to follow
Faretta'selaborate waiver process. This is important in the exceptional
case involving abusive conduct toward one's appointed attorney, as
courts in such cases should be permitted to apply the forfeiture rationale
regardless of whether the defendant has been advised of the dangers
associated with self-representation, a requirement that would not make

262. See United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 383, 386 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that "[b]efore
applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, a trial court must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that '(1) the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing (2) that was intended to
render the declarant unavailable as a witness and (3) that did, in fact, render the declarant
unavailable as a witness' and finding that the trial court properly admitted certain hearsay
statements against the defendant under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception due to ample record
evidence supporting the trial court's ruling (quoting United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 241 (4th
Cir. 2005))); see also United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming
district court's application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine after finding that the district
court's stated reasons, and the record as a whole clearly supported application of the exception).
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sense in that particular context, where there is no longer any realistic
choice to be made between the representation rights.26 3
VI.

CONCLUSION

Two fundamental rights exist within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee to "the assistance of counsel" for one's defense: the right to
representation by counsel and the right to self-representation.264
Manipulative defendants often pit these competing rights against each
other and fail to clearly choose between them, placing courts in
precarious positions with reversible error on the line. 265 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized, defendants who deliberately obstruct the
judicial process must not be permitted to take advantage of their own
wrongdoing, and, in this particular context, must not be allowed to gain
a new trial in the event of judicial misstep caused by muddled case
law.266 Perhaps the best method for stripping manipulative defendants of
this tool is greater uniformity and certainty in this area. Although
appellate courts often defer to trial courts in such cases, regardless of
whether the trial court imposes self-representation or representation by
counsel, the more-routine use of counsel for the unruly defendant who
fails to make the requisite election is warranted.26 7 If and when a court
must step into the shoes of the obstructionist defendant and substitute
its judgment for the defendant's, assistance of counsel should be the
usual remedy. 68

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995).
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.E.
See supraPart V.D.
See supra Part V.A.
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